Friday, March 22, 2019

Philadelphia Fed – 1st Quarter 2019 Survey Of Professional Forecasters

The Philadelphia Fed 1st Quarter 2019 Survey of Professional Forecasters was released on March 22, 2019.  This survey is somewhat unique in various regards, such as it incorporates a longer time frame for various measures.
The survey shows, among many measures, the following median expectations:
Real GDP: (annual average level)
full-year 2019:  2.4%
full-year 2020:  2.0%
full-year 2021:  1.8%
full-year 2022:  2.1%
Unemployment Rate: (annual average level)
for 2019: 3.7%
for 2020: 3.7%
for 2021: 4.0%
for 2022: 4.2%
Regarding the risk of a negative quarter in real GDP in any of the next few quarters, mean estimates are 16.7%, 11.2%, 14.5%, 17.9% and 21.9% for each of the quarters from Q1 2019 through Q1 2020, respectively.
As well, there are also a variety of time frames shown (present quarter through the year 2028) with the median expected inflation (annualized) of each.  Inflation is measured in Headline and Core CPI and Headline and Core PCE.  Over all time frames expectations are shown to be in the 1.1% to 2.4% range.
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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2829.62 as this post is written

The U.S. Economic Situation – March 22, 2019 Update

Perhaps the main reason that I write of our economic situation is that I continue to believe, based upon various analyses, that our economic situation is in many ways misunderstood.  While no one likes to contemplate a future rife with economic adversity, current and future economic problems must be properly recognized and rectified if high-quality, sustainable long-term economic vitality is to be realized.
There are an array of indications and other “warning signs” – many readily apparent – that current economic activity and financial market performance is accompanied by exceedingly perilous dynamics.
I have written extensively about this peril, including in the following:
Building Financial Danger” (ongoing updates)
My analyses continues to indicate that the growing level of financial danger will lead to the next stock market crash that will also involve (as seen in 2008) various other markets as well.  Key attributes of this next crash is its outsized magnitude (when viewed from an ultra-long term historical perspective) and the resulting economic impact.  This next financial crash is of tremendous concern, as my analyses indicate it will lead to a Super Depression – i.e. an economy characterized by deeply embedded, highly complex, and difficult-to-solve problems.
For long-term reference purposes, here is a chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average since 1900, depicted on a monthly basis using a LOG scale (updated through March 20, 2019, with a last value of 25745.67):
(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)
DJIA since 1900 chart
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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2854.88 as this post is written

Thursday, March 21, 2019

Jerome Powell’s March 20, 2019 Press Conference – Notable Aspects

On Wednesday, March 20, 2019 Jerome Powell gave his scheduled March 2019 FOMC Press Conference. (link of video and related materials)
Below are Jerome Powell’s comments I found most notable – although I don’t necessarily agree with them – in the order they appear in the transcript.  These comments are excerpted from the “Transcript of Chairman Powell’s Press Conference“ (preliminary)(pdf) of March 20, 2019, with the accompanying “FOMC Statement” and “Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, March 2019.“
From Chairman Powell’s opening comments:
CHAIR POWELL. Good afternoon everyone, and welcome.  I will begin with an overview of economic conditions and an explanation of the decisions the Committee made at today’s meeting.
My colleagues and I have one overarching goal: to sustain the economic expansion, with a strong job market and stable prices, for the benefit of the American people.  The U.S. economy is in a good place, and we will continue to use our monetary policy tools to help keep it there.  The jobs market is strong, showing healthier wage gains and prompting many people to join or remain in the workforce.  The unemployment rate is near historic lows, and inflation remains near our 2 percent goal.  We continue to expect that the American economy will grow at a solid pace in 2019, although likely slower than the very strong pace of 2018.  We believe that our current policy stance is appropriate.  
also:
Data arriving since September suggest that growth is slowing somewhat more than expected.  Financial conditions tightened considerably over the fourth quarter.  While conditions have eased since then, they remain less supportive of growth than during most of 2018.  Growth has slowed in some foreign economies, notably in Europe and China.  While the U.S. economy showed little evidence of slowdown through the end of 2018, the limited data we have so far this year have been somewhat more mixed.  Unusually strong payroll job growth in January was followed by little growth at all in February.  Smoothing through these variations, average monthly job growth appears to have stepped down from last year’s strong pace, but job gains remain well above the pace necessary to provide jobs for new labor force entrants.  Many other labor market indicators continue to show strength.  Weak retail sales data for December bounced back considerably in January, but on balance seem to point to somewhat slower growth in consumer spending.  Business fixed investment also appears to be growing at a slower pace than last year.  Inflation has been muted, and some indicators of longer-term inflation expectations remain at the low end of their ranges in recent years.  Along with these developments, unresolved policy issues such as Brexit and the ongoing trade negotiations pose some risks to the outlook.
Jerome Powell’s responses as indicated to the various questions:
HEATHER LONG. Heather Long from the Washington Post. On the broader economy, can you clarify how worried the FOMC is about a steep slowdown. Some of the actions today look like there is more worry, and on the balance sheet, can you clarify, does the FOMC see the runoff as a form of monetary tightening? 
CHAIR POWELL. So, on the outlook, our outlook is a positive one. So, as I mentioned, FOMC participants continue to see growth this year of around two percent, just a bit below what we saw back in at the end of last year. And part of that is seeing that economic fundamentals, underlying economic fundamentals are still very strong. You have a strong labor market by most measures. You have rising incomes. You’ve got very low unemployment. You have confident surveys for households and also for businesses that are at attractive levels, and you also have financial conditions that are more accommodative than they were a couple of months ago. So, we see the outlook as a positive one. As far as balance sheet, the balance sheet plan, the answer to that is, you asked whether that’s related to our monetary policy in effect, and the answer is really no. We still think of the interest rate tool as the principal tool of monetary policy, and we think of ourselves as returning the balance sheet to a normal level over the course of the next six months, and were not really thinking of those as two different tools of monetary policy. 
STEVE LIESMAN. Steve Liesman, CNBC. Mr. Chairman, can you talk about how global developments are affecting the U.S.? What’s the cause of the weakness over there? How much is it responsible for the downgrade in GDP over here and what impact are tariffs both in the United States and retaliatory tariffs having on both the U.S. and the global economies? Thank you. 
CHAIR POWELL. So, global economy was a tailwind for the United States in 2017. That was the year of synchronized global growth, and we began 2018 expecting and hoping for more of the same. What happened instead is that the global economy started to gradually slow, and now we see a situation where the European economy has slowed substantially and so has the Chinese economy, although the European economy more. And just as strong global growth was a tailwind, weaker global growth can be a headwind to our economy. How big is that effect? It’s hard to be precise about it, but clearly we will feel that. It is an integrated global economy, and global financial markets are integrated as well. In terms of what’s causing it, it seems to be a range of different things. In China you have, you know, factors that are very specific to China. The main point though is that I would say the outlook, let’s look at the outlook, Chinese authorities have taken many steps since the middle of last year to support economic activity, and
I think the base case is that ultimately Chinese activity will stabilize at an attractive level. And in Europe, you know, we see some weakening, but, again, we don’t see, we don’t see recession, and we do see positive growth still. You ask about tariffs. I would say tariffs may be a factor in China. I don’t think they’re the main factor. I think the main factors are the levering campaign that the government undertook a couple of years ago and also just the longer term slowing to a more sustainable pace of growth that economies find as they mature. In terms of our own economy, the level of tariffs is relatively small in the size of our economy, relative to the size of our economy. We have since the beginning of the year and before really been hearing from our extensive network of business contacts, a lot of concerns about tariffs, concerns about material costs on imported products and the loss of markets and things like that, depending on which industry. So, there’s a fair amount of uncertainty. It’s hard to say how much of an effect that’s having on our economy. It’s very hard to tease that apart, but I will say it’s been a prominent concern among our business contacts for some time now.
also:
JIM TANKERSLEY. Hi, Mr. Chairman, Jim Tankersley, New York Times. I’m curious, you’re now a full percentage point, actually more than a percentage point below the White House in your projections for growth this year. By my calculations, that’s the largest spread we’ve seen since the end of the recession between the White House and the Fed. Why, for one, do you see, do you see the economy so differently than they do, and do you worry at all about implications for policy from that? 
CHAIR POWELL. I haven’t, I haven’t seen their projection. I wouldn’t comment on their projection. I would take it this way. You can think of growth as being composed of two things. And one is really growth in the workforce, more hours worked, and the other is productivity. Its output per hour. You can really think of growth as those two things. And I’ve been calling, often mentioned these days that it would be great if we had national level policies to support higher labor force participation. The United States is now one of the lowest countries among the advanced economies in terms of our labor force participation by prime age workers. And that’s a place where we can grow faster. If we can bring more people into the labor force and give them a chance to contribute to and benefit from our overall prosperity, that will be a great thing for the country. So, I would like to see that. Productivity is much harder. Very difficult to project productivity over long stretches of time. It’s a function of evolving technology. So, I guess I would say what’s the, what is the potential growth rate? It’s quite hard to know with any precision, and I just would like to see us, you know, undertake an effort to make it be as high as it can sustainably be. 
JIM TANKERSLEY. If I could follow up on that, do you see the tax cuts, the 2017 tax cuts as having provided a large boost to labor force participation as the White House does. 
CHAIR POWELL. I would say so. I think it’s clear that the tax and spending policies that were adopted early last year supported demand in a significant way last year. And it’s also the case, I think, that they should have some supply side effects. I think it’s hard to know, it’s hard to identify those with any precision, and we hope they’re, we hope they’re very large. And the idea would be that lowering corporate taxes would spur more corporate investment, which would spur more productivity, and lowering individual taxes would spur greater labor force participation. I wouldn’t want to be handing, you know, assigning creditor blame for that, but I do think that the performance of labor force participation over the last really three or four years has been an upside surprise that most people didn’t see coming, and it’s extremely welcome.
also:
TREVOR HUNNICUTT. Trevor Hunnicutt from Reuters. You mentioned that you have kind of a positive outlook as it regards the economy but also see slower growth on the household side and the business side. Given how big of a part of the U.S. economy that is, what gives you kind of confidence that the slowdown we’re seeing is temporary. 
CHAIR POWELL. So on the household side, what we saw was a very weak reading on retail sales in December and then a bounceback in the January reading, and, you know, it was a surprise, I would say, and inconsistent with a significant amount of other data. We’re not dismissing it in any way, but I would go back to what is it that supports consumer spending. It’s 70 percent of the economy, as you point out, and its strong economic underlying fundamentals. So, rising wages, high levels of employment, low levels of unemployment, high levels of job creation. Confidence. 
The household confidence surveys have moved back up to where they were last summer. So we look at those fundamentals, and we think that looks like a setting in which consumption will have support from underlying economic fundamentals. And that’s really what we’re thinking there. So, you know, we’re also patiently watching and waiting and not assuming. We’re not taking no signal from the incoming data. That’s why we called it out in our statement. So, I think our eyes are open on this. 
NICK TIMIRAOS. Nick Timiraos of the Wall Street Journal. Chair Powell, in 1998 the Fed eased policy in a way that some say may have avoided a recession, others say may have helped fuel the NASDAQ tech stock bubble, and financial conditions have eased considerably this year since the policy pivot that you made clear in January, the S&P, for example, it’s just three percent below last summer’s peak. And so I wonder, does this episode from 20 years ago bear at all on your thinking today about the risks posed by rising asset values in an environment of a shallower policy path? 
CHAIR POWELL. We’re in a very different world today and post crisis, because we now very carefully monitor financial conditions and financial stability concerns on an ongoing basis, and we publish a report twice a year, and we have quarterly board meeting and briefings where we look deeply into these things. So this is something we have very much on our radar screen. 
And I would say overall we don’t see financial stability vulnerabilities as high. There are some aspects of the financial markets that we’re carefully monitoring, and those are in the nature of things that might be amplifiers to a downturn as opposed to a financial stability concern, which might lead to a financial crisis and that kind of thing, which we don’t see. 
So, we do monitor that, and I would also say, you know, that the whole question of monetary policy and financial stability is an unsettled and difficult one in our world. We do think that the principal tools for, you know, for managing financial stability are regulation, supervision, macroprudential tools, and those sorts of things as opposed to changing the interest rate. But we’re certainly very mindful of financial conditions and those risks. 
NICK TIMIRAOS. If I could ask a followup? If it’s the case that we’re in a lower neutral interest rate world where you could have more asset price appreciation, do you think the Fed needs more macroprudential tools so that it doesn’t have to lean on monetary to do so much. 
CHAIR POWELL. It’s a very difficult question with a long answer. We, in our system, we mainly rely on through the cycle tools like high capital and stress tests. Our financial stability system is built on those tools. High capital, high liquidity, resolution planning, stress testing. So those are always on. We also have some tools, like the countercyclical capital buffer, which we can deploy at times when vulnerabilities are meaningfully above normal. But we do rely on those tools. And I would say our banks are well capitalized. They’re far better capitalized and better aware of their risks and more liquid than they were before the financial crisis. So they’ll be more resilient in, you know, in difficult states of the economy. 
also:
NANCY MARSHALL-GENZER. Nancy Marshall-Genzer with Marketplace. Just a quick follow-up on Brexit. You mentioned that you’re making sure that U.S. financial institutions are ready for whatever outcome. I’m wondering, can you be a little more specific about that, and also how are you preparing for any pressures that a hard Brexit would put on the U.S. dollar?
CHAIR POWELL. Well, as I mentioned, you know, with the stress test that the largest financial institutions, and those are the ones that tend to be active internationally, that they undergo every year, we put them through very large financial shocks with large losses and big changes in markets every year. And we vary that every year. So, that’s a pretty good, you know, having done that for a number of years now, that’s, and having them be required to have adequate capital and liquidity even after all that happens. So that’s a good thing to have done knowing that you’re going into something that’s quite unknown, which may prove stressful. It may not prove stressful depending on what the outcome is. So, I think all that has probably prepared our institutions well. That said, nothing like this has happened in recent years, and so it’s really hard to be confident. So, we’re very watchful about what’s going on.
[ Inaudible Comment ]
So we don’t, you know, the dollar is really the business of the Treasury Department. It’s certainly a financial condition unto itself that plays into our models, but we don’t, you know, seek or model or attempt to affect the dollar directly with our policies.
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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2854.14 as this post is written

Wednesday, March 20, 2019

Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)

The St. Louis Fed’s Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) is one index that is supposed to measure stress in the financial system.  Its reading as of the March 14, 2019 update (reflecting data through March 8, 2019) is -1.216.
Of course, there are a variety of other measures and indices that are supposed to measure financial stress and other related issues, both from the Federal Reserve as well as from private sources.
Two other indices that I regularly monitor include the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) as well as the Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI).
Here are summary descriptions of each, as seen in FRED:
The National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) measures risk, liquidity and leverage in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as in the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Positive values of the NFCI indicate financial conditions that are tighter than average, while negative values indicate financial conditions that are looser than average.
The adjusted NFCI (ANFCI). This index isolates a component of financial conditions uncorrelated with economic conditions to provide an update on how financial conditions compare with current economic conditions.
For further information, please visit the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s web site:
Below are the most recently updated charts of the NFCI and ANFCI, respectively.
The NFCI chart below was last updated on March 20, 2019 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through March 15, 2019, on a weekly basis.  The March 15 value is -.87:
NFCI
Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 20, 2019: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCI
The ANFCI chart below was last updated on March 20, 2019 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through March 15, 2019, on a weekly basis.  The March 15 value is -.71:
ANFCI
Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 20, 2019: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ANFCI
_________
I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2824.84 as this post is written

Tuesday, March 19, 2019

Trends Of S&P500 Earnings Forecasts

S&P500 earnings trends and estimates are a notably important topic, for a variety of reasons, at this point in time.
FactSet publishes a report titled “Earnings Insight” that contains a variety of information including the trends and expectations of S&P500 earnings.
For reference purposes, here are two charts as seen in the “Earnings Insight” (pdf) report of March 15, 2019:
from page 23:
(click on charts to enlarge images)
S&P500 EPS forecasts 2019 & 2020
from page 24:
S&P500 EPS 2009-2020
_____
I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2832.94 as this post is written

Monday, March 18, 2019

Annual S&P500 EPS Forecasts For Years 2018, 2019 & 2020

As many are aware, Refinitiv publishes earnings estimates for the S&P500.  (My other posts concerning S&P earnings estimates can be found under the S&P500 Earnings label)
The following estimates are from Exhibit 24 of the “S&P500 Earnings Scorecard” (pdf) of March 18, 2019, and represent an aggregation of individual S&P500 component “bottom up” analyst forecasts.  For reference, the Year 2014 value is $118.78/share, the Year 2015 value is $117.46, the Year 2016 value is $118.10/share, and the Year 2017 value is $132.00/share:
Year 2018 estimate:
$162.05/share
Year 2019 estimate:
$167.92/share
Year 2020 estimate:
$188.05/share
_____
I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2830.54 as this post is written

Standard & Poor’s S&P500 EPS Estimates 2018 2019 – March 14, 2019

As many are aware, Standard & Poor’s publishes earnings estimates for the S&P500.  (My posts concerning their estimates can be found under the S&P500 Earnings label)
For reference purposes, the most current estimates are reflected below, and are as of March 14, 2019:
Year 2018 estimates add to the following:
-From a “bottom up” perspective, operating earnings of $151.62/share
-From a “top down” perspective, operating earnings of N/A
-From a “bottom up” perspective, “as reported” earnings of $132.08/share
Year 2019 estimates add to the following:
-From a “bottom up” perspective, operating earnings of $165.98/share
-From a “top down” perspective, operating earnings of N/A
-From a “bottom up” perspective, “as reported” earnings of $154.31/share
_____
I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2829.29 as this post is written

Friday, March 15, 2019

Long-Term Charts Of The ECRI WLI & ECRI WLI, Gr. – March 15, 2019 Update

As I stated in my July 12, 2010 post (“ECRI WLI Growth History“):
For a variety of reasons, I am not as enamored with ECRI’s WLI and WLI Growth measures as many are.
However, I do think the measures are important and deserve close monitoring and scrutiny.
Below are three long-term charts, from the Doug Short site’s ECRI update post of March 15, 2019 titled “ECRI Weekly Leading Index Update:  All Measures Up Again.”  These charts are on a weekly basis through the March 15, 2019 release, indicating data through March 8, 2019.
Here is the ECRI WLI (defined at ECRI’s glossary):
ECRI WLI
This next chart depicts, on a long-term basis, the Year-over-Year change in the 4-week moving average of the WLI:
ECRI YoY of the Four-Week Moving Average
This last chart depicts, on a long-term basis, the WLI, Gr.:
ECRI WLI,Gr.
_________
I post various economic indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2823.59 as this post is written

Thursday, March 14, 2019

Deflation Probabilities – March 14, 2019 Update

While I do not agree with the current readings of the measure – I think the measure dramatically understates the probability of deflation, as measured by the CPI – the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta maintains an interesting data series titled “Deflation Probabilities.”
As stated on the site:
Using estimates derived from Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) markets, described in a technical appendix, this weekly report provides two measures of the probability of consumer price index (CPI) deflation through 2023.
A chart shows the trends of the probabilities.  As one can see in the chart, the readings are volatile.
As for the current weekly reading, the March 14, 2019 update states the following:
The 2017–22 and 2018–23 deflation probabilities have remained at 0 percent through March 13 after falling from 5 percent to 0 percent on February 13 following the release of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the incorporation of revised seasonal adjustment factors for the CPI. These deflation probabilities, measuring the likelihoods of net declines in the consumer price index over the five-year periods starting in early 2017 and early 2018, are estimated from prices of the five-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) issued in April 2017 and April 2018 and the 10-year TIPS issued in July 2012 and July 2013.
_________
I post various economic indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2808.48 as this post is written

The March 2019 Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey

The March 2019 Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey was published on March 14, 2019.  The headline is “WSJ Survey: Economists Cut Forecasts For Jobs and Economic Growth in Early 2019.”
I found numerous items to be notable – although I don’t necessarily agree with them – both within the article and in the “Economist Q&A” section.
An excerpt:
A large majority of economists, 84.2%, said they saw a greater risk that the economy would grow more slowly than that it would grow more quickly over the next 12 months. When asked about the biggest downside risk to their forecasts, nearly half of respondents, 46.8%, mentioned trade policy or China.
As seen in the “Recession Probability” section, the average response as to the odds of another recession starting within the next 12 months was 24.51%. The individual estimates, of those who responded, ranged from 1% to 60%.  For reference, the average response in February’s survey was 24.53%.
As stated in the article, the survey’s respondents were 66 academic, financial and business economists.  Not every economist answered every question.  The survey was conducted March 8 – March 12, 2019.
The current average forecasts among economists polled include the following:
GDP:
full-year 2018:  3.0%
full-year 2019:  2.1%
full-year 2020:  1.7%
full-year 2021:  1.8%
Unemployment Rate:
December 2019: 3.7%
December 2020: 3.9%
December 2021: 4.2%
10-Year Treasury Yield:
December 2019: 2.93%
December 2020: 2.94%
December 2021: 2.99%
CPI:
December 2019:  2.10%
December 2020:  2.10%
December 2021:  2.10%
Crude Oil  ($ per bbl):
for 12/31/2019: $58.47
for 12/31/2020: $58.14
for 12/31/2021: $57.35
(note: I highlight this WSJ Economic Forecast survey each month; commentary on past surveys can be found under the “Economic Forecasts” label)
_____
I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2807.82 as this post is written

Wednesday, March 13, 2019

Durable Goods New Orders – Long-Term Charts Through January 2019

Many people place emphasis on Durable Goods New Orders as a prominent economic indicator and/or leading economic indicator.
For reference, below are two charts depicting this measure.
First, from the St. Louis Fed site (FRED), a chart through January 2019, updated on March 13, 2019. This value is $255,273 ($ Millions):
(click on charts to enlarge images)
Second, here is the chart depicting this measure on a “Percentage Change from a Year Ago” basis, with a last value of 8.4%:
DGORDER Percent Change From Year Ago
Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Manufacturers’ New Orders:  Durable Goods [DGORDER]; U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau; accessed March 13, 2019;
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGORDER
_________
I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.
_____
The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation
SPX at 2814.49 as this post is written