Friday, July 30, 2010

U.S. Dollar Target

On July 8 I wrote my last post concerning the U.S. Dollar.  In the last line of that post I said "...I continue to believe the U.S. Dollar is highly vulnerable to a substantial decline."

As "substantial decline" is somewhat open to interpretation, I would like to clarify what I meant.

Here is a chart of the U.S. Dollar on a monthly basis since 1983:

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of

As one can see, the current price of 81.64 is approaching the technically significant 80-level.  This level has served as technical support on a number of occasions.

If that level is broken, there is not much precedence from a longer-term perspective.  For many reasons I doubt that the 70.7 level reached in 2008 will serve as any type of significant technical support.  Below the 70.7 level is obviously a "new frontier" with no obvious strong technical support.  In essence, from a technical perspective the downside would appear rather open-ended.

From a fundamental perspective, a substantial dollar decline appears likely as well.  As I wrote in my January 13 U.S. Dollar post, "Many people, especially those of the “hard money” and “Austrian” philosophies, have long held that many of the actions we (as a nation) have been taking to combat our current period of economic weakness would unduly pressure the dollar.  These actions have included very low interest rates, truly outsized interventions (including “money printing”) and deficit spending."

Additionally, I would like to address one comment I have repeatedly heard regarding the U.S. Dollar.  Many people believe that the U.S. Dollar is (still) a "safe haven" as it has increased in price during The Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 as well as market turmoil during this year.  As such, this purported continual "safe haven" status is supposed to support the idea that the U.S. Dollar is strong fundamentally.

While I see the reasoning behind this logic, I don't believe that this logic or interpretation of recent upward Dollar movements is correct.  Many complex factors impact the price movements of the U.S. Dollar, and I wouldn't assume that just because it has recently increased during periods of market stress that it will continue to do so.

In summary, I continue to believe the U.S. Dollar is highly vulnerable to a substantial decline.  This decline has the potential to be rather open-ended in nature, as supported by both technical and fundamental factors.  Once the 70-level is broken, the U.S. Dollar decline would likely become very pernicious and levels of 50, as well as substantially below, should be considered possibilities.

Should such a U.S. Dollar decline occurs, this currency weakness alone would create an entire new set of severe economic problems and challenges.

back to home

SPX at 1113.68 as this post is written

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Updates On Economic Indicators July 2010

Here is an update on various indicators that are supposed to predict and/or depict economic activity.  These indicators have been discussed in previous blog posts:

The July Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)(pdf) updated as of July 26, 2010:

click on chart to enlarge image

The Consumer Metrics Institute Contraction Watch:

The USA TODAY/IHS Global Insight Economic Outlook Index:

An excerpt from July 26, 2010:

"The July update of the USA TODAY/IHS Global Insight Economic Outlook Index shows real GDP growth, at a six-month annualized growth rate, slowing to 2.5% in December. The end of government stimulus spending and inventory buildup combined with continuing high unemployment, a weak housing market, tight credit and high debt are behind the slowdown.

The index predicts future real GDP growth (gross domestic product, adjusted for inflation) based on 11 leading economic and financial indicators.

Four of the 11 indicators were positive in July, down from five last month and the lowest number since USA TODAY first published the index in June 2009."

The ECRI WLI (Weekly Leading Index):

As of 7/16/10 the WLI was at 120.17 and the WLI, Gr. was at -10.5%.  A chart of the Weekly Leading and Weekly Coincident Indexes:

The Dow Jones ESI (Economic Sentiment Indicator):

The Indicator as of June 30 was at 40.3, as seen below:

An excerpt from the June 30 Press Release:

"“The ESI’s modest and steady rise over the last couple of months is a positive sign, but the U.S. is not out of the woods yet,” Dow Jones Newswires “Money Talks” Columnist Alen Mattich said. “Anxiety about the U.S.’s employment conditions and questions around Europe’s stability are key concerns that are unlikely to subside soon.”

The Dow Jones Economic Sentiment Indicator aims to predict the health of the U.S. economy by analyzing the coverage of 15 major daily newspapers in the U.S. Using a proprietary algorithm and derived data technology, the ESI examines every article in each of the newspapers for positive and negative sentiment about the economy. The indicator is calculated through Dow Jones Insight, a media tracking and analysis tool. The technology used for the ESI also powers Dow Jones Lexicon, a proprietary dictionary that allows traders and analysts to determine sentiment, frequency and other relevant complex patterns within news to develop predictive trading strategies."

The Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions (ADS) Index:

Here is the latest chart, updated through 7-17-10:

The Conference Board Leading (LEI) and Coincident (CEI) Economic Indexes:

As of July 22, 2010, the LEI was at 109.8 and the CEI was at 101.4 in June.

An excerpt from the June 22, 2010 Press Release:

""The indicators point to slower growth through the fall," says Ken Goldstein, economist at The Conference Board."

“New Financial Conditions Index”

I wrote a post concerning this index on 3/10/10.  There is currently no updated value available.

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this blog are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

back to home

SPX at 1113.68 as this post is written

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Consumer Metrics Institute's Readings

I have been following The Consumer Metrics Institute's work since March.  I have previously written two posts focusing on their work (both found on March 31), as well as included it in the monthly "Updates On Economic Indicators."

To briefly summarize, I find their work and methodologies very interesting, especially given that they appear quite different than other such measures that purport to depict/predict economic activity.

Here is one of their current charts, that of the Daily Growth Index:

(click on chart to enlarge image)

Given its proprietary methodologies and relatively limited history, it seems likely that varying interpretations of The Consumer Metrics Institute's data can be supported.   My interpretation of the chart is that the growing "rift" between GDP and the CMI's Consumer Growth Index is significant.  This begs the question as to which trend will prove accurate going forward; that of GDP growth around 3% (that which is the current consensus among economists for both full-year 2010 & 2011) or that of the CMI's Growth Index, which seems to be indicating some type of impending negative (perhaps significantly so) GDP growth rate?

Of course, one can argue that the CMI's growth rate can suddenly materially increase, which would likely support a positive GDP growth rate.   Of course, such a sudden increase is possible, but my "guess" (which is seemingly all that one can offer, given the proprietary nature of the data) is that such is unlikely.

Of further note is the CMI's "Contraction Watch" chart (not shown) and its implications.

Of course, the CMI's readings of weakening economic activity are not entirely unique.  ECRI's recent WLI Growth readings have generated much discussions lately given the WLI Growth's significant and rapid decline.

It should be very interesting to see how the CMI's readings evolve as compared to actual economic activity...

back to home

SPX at 1115.01 as this post is written

Monday, July 26, 2010

Personal Income Less Transfer Payments Chart

On July 1, 2010 posted the following chart:

(click on chart to enlarge image)

I find this chart interesting especially given its long-term perspective.

As seen by this measure, the post-2007 experience is (very) atypical...

back to home

SPX at 1102.66 as this post is written

Friday, July 23, 2010

4 Confidence Charts

Here are four charts reflecting confidence survey readings.  These are from the site.

I find these charts valuable as they provide a long-term history of each survey, which is rare.

Each survey chart is plotted in blue, below the S&P500:

(click on each chart to enlarge image)

Conference Board Consumer Confidence, last updated 6-29-10:

University of Michigan Consumer Confidence, last updated 7-16-10:

ABC News Consumer Comfort Index, last updated 7-8-10:

NFIB Small Business Optimism, last updated 7-15-10:

As one can see, these charts continue to show subdued readings, especially when viewed from a long-term perspective.

These charts should be interesting to monitor going forward.  Although I don't believe that confidence surveys should be overemphasized, they do help to delineate how the economic environment is being perceived.

back to home

SPX at 1094.59 as this post is written

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Infrastructure And The Economy

The Wall Street Journal had an article on July 17-18 titled "Roads to Ruin: Towns Rip Up the Pavement."

The story highlights the practice of converting paved roads to gravel instead of repaving them in order to save money.

This is yet another example of our (national) inability to maintain our infrastructure.

I believe that the current state of our national infrastructure represents a "silent crisis."  It is not one which receives a lot of press or attention, yet is very significant for a variety of reasons.

Apart from the obvious risks posed to citizens from decrepit, crumbling infrastructure there are other broader issues.   The longer one waits to fix the existing infrastructure, the higher the cost.  Needless to say, at this time there is not trillions of dollars available to make the needed repairs.  As such, one is led to wonder when such repairs will be made.  Even if the trillions of dollars needed were suddenly available, such repairs can't be made in a short time period due to a variety of factors.

Of course, it is easy to let such repairs "slide", since the costs are high and few currently seem concerned about the issue.

The state of the infrastructure can also be examined from an economic standpoint.  I view the deteriorating infrastructure as being both a symptom of as well as a contributor to the "economic brownfield" condition that I described in the article "America's Economic Future - 'Greenfield' or 'Brownfield'?"

back to home

SPX at 1093.67 as this post is written

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

2-Year Treasury: Odd Occurrences

I have written of "odd occurrences" and their significance, most recently in the July 14 post.

The yield of the 2-Year Treasury is one example of these "odd occurrences."  Here is a 3 year daily chart:

click on chart to enlarge image; chart courtesy of

Plotted below the 2-Year Treasury yield is the price of the S&P500.  As one can see, the 2-year Treasury yield at .61% is now at a level less than that seen during the height of the Financial Crisis during Q4 2008.

While there are many reasons that can at least partially explain why the 2-Year Treasury yield is so low now, it is still what I call an "odd occurrence."  Why, during what most believe is an economic recovery, with generally robust financial markets, would investors in the 2-Year Treasury accept such low yields?

Of note, this 2-Year yield has acted strangely in the past; I commented upon the dip in yield during November 2009 in this November 23, 2009 post.

back to home

SPX at 1071.25 as this post is written

Monday, July 19, 2010

Finance Reform Bill - A Few Comments

With regard to the finance reform bill, I found a few comments in Friday's (July 16) Wall Street Journal to be notable.

First, this quote from a story titled "Impact to Reach Beyond Wall Street":

""The bill does not respond at all to the causes of the financial crisis," said Peter Wallison, a former Reagan administration official and co-director of American Enterprise Institute's financial policy studies program. "Instead, it weakens the U.S. economy and reduces economic growth."

Second, a couple of quotes from another July 16 story titled "Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape":

"The bill "is a 2,300-page legislative monster…that expands the scope and the powers of ineffective bureaucracies," said Sen. Richard Shelby (R., Ala.)."


""We failed completely to understand the complexity of what the impact of the national decline in housing prices would be in the financial system," said Ms. Yellen, currently president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. "We saw a number of different things, and we failed to connect the dots."

My comments:

I am in general agreement with the quotes from Peter Wallison and Richard Shelby.

I included the quote from Janet Yellen as I believe it is notable, and frankly, I was surprised to see it.

From an "all things considered" standpoint, I don't believe this bill provides any aggregate value.  It won't prevent any future financial crisis.   I think it is notable that there is so much negative commentary about this bill from the financial and economic community; some of this commentary is appended to the second story mentioned above.

Furthermore, not only does this bill not provide aggregate value, but it also has the potential to be quite pernicious on numerous fronts.  At this point, it is impossible to predict how this bill will be enacted; however, it is clear that there is outsized potential for many unintended harmful consequences.

back to home

SPX at 1064.88 as this post is written

Sunday, July 18, 2010

ECRI WLI Growth: Wild Times

As I commented in the July 12 post:

"For a variety of reasons, I am not as enamored with ECRI’s WLI and WLI Growth measures as many are.

However, I do think the measures are important and deserve close monitoring and scrutiny."

Along those lines, I would like to make comments on the ECRI WLI Growth chart, as seen from a long-term perspective.  This chart is from Doug Short's blog post of July 16:

(click on chart to enlarge image)

As one can see, the chart shows the history of the ECRI WLI Growth vs. GDP and recessions from 1965.

I believe the wild swing from 2008 to the present is very significant for many reasons, of which five are discussed below:

First, as one can see, this swing dwarfs others from a long-term historical perspective.

Second, as many have commented, this depth of negative readings has a high incidence of presaging recessions.

Third, as I have commented extensively, this is yet one more economic statistic that is showing a highly atypical reading, especially if one believes we are in an economic recovery.  This is especially evident when one looks at the currently ECRI reading vs. the GDP reading.  As such, it is a "(negative) outlier" as I have referred to such (most recently in the July 14 post.)

Fourth, another question to ask is how one should interpret such a pronounced spike and then decline?  One thought is that the index may be exhibiting more volatility than in the past - which may distort any historical comparisons, correlations and/or conclusions one may make with regard to its movements.

Fifth, I find the long-term chart (not shown) of the ECRI WLI (Weekly Leading Index) itself to be rather interesting.

Given the above, the ECRI WLI Growth Index, in conjunction with overall economic conditions, certainly should be interesting to watch going forward...

back to home

SPX at 1064.88 as this post is written

Friday, July 16, 2010

The July 2010 Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey

I found a few items of interest in The July Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey.

The economists surveyed continue to place a relatively low probability on a "double-dip" recession.  As stated in the article, "Economists, on average, now see the odds of double-dip recession at 20%."

As well, there a variety of interesting questions asked of the economists.  These questions are seen in the Q&A section of the detail.

The current average forecasts among economists polled include the following:

Ten-Year Treasury Yield:
for 12/31/2010: 3.5%
for 12/31/2011: 4.33%

for 12/1/2010: 1.26%
for 12/1/2011: 1.93%

Unemployment Rate:
for 12/1/2010: 9.41%
for 12/1/2011: 8.57%

for 12/31/2010: $76.78
for 12/31/2011: $81.01

full-year 2010 : 2.93%
full-year 2011 : 2.99%

As compared to last month's survey, there was little change in the above categories.

(note: I comment upon this survey each month; commentary on past surveys can be found under the "economic forecasts" tag)

I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this blog are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

back to home

SPX at 1096.48 as this post is written

Thursday, July 15, 2010

S&P500 Support And Resistance

Here are two charts that I have found interesting from a Technical Analysis perspective.  I believe they are helpful in understanding the current stock market situation.

I would like to reiterate my view that we are in a bear market rally, albeit subject to conditions I spoke of in my June 2 post.

Here is a weekly chart showing the S&P500 from 2007.  As one can see, this view seems to indicate that resistance has become support:

(click on chart for larger image)(chart courtesy of

Here is a chart from Doug Short's website from a July 13 post.  It shows the S&P500 from 2008, indicating a rising channel:

back to home

SPX at 1083.34 as this post is written

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

"A S&P500 Target Of 100?" Revisited

In March of 2009 I wrote an article titled "A S&P500 Target of 100?"

I am sure that the mere idea of such a target seems impossible to many.  However, for a variety of reasons, many indicated in the aforementioned article, I believe that such a target is not only possible but increasing in likelihood.

I would like to provide an update on the ideas originally presented in that article, given that much has happened since that article was written.  In this update I will divide my comments into two areas, technical and fundamental analysis, as I did in that original article.  In order to avoid repetition, I will assume that one has already read the aforementioned original article.

Technical Analysis

Here is a chart of the S&P500 and Dow Jones Industrials on a monthly basis since 1980: (chart courtesy of

(click on chart to enlarge image):

As one can see, in 1982 the S&P500 price of 101.44  roughly corresponded to a Dow Jones Industrials price of 770.

From a technical analysis perspective, it remains difficult to derive any meaningful "support" between current S&P500 levels and that of the 100 price region.

Additionally, there are a variety of other technical measures that are worrisome, both from a long-term and short-term perspective.

One other item that should be considered is that of time.  As I wrote in the March 2009 article, "Should the stock market fall to the 100 area, what might be the timing?  Again, this is a difficult question.  If one were to casually answer, one might think such a decline from the October 2007 highs might occur in a 3-5 year timeframe, perhaps longer."  Of course, we are rapidly approaching the 3rd anniversary of the October 2007 high, which is significant.

Fundamental Analysis

The fundamental argument for an S&P500 target of 100 is complex.  Many would vigorously argue against such given the current economic environment of strong corporate earnings, robust financial markets, optimistic consensus economic forecasts, and various statistics showing sustained growth.

Perhaps the easiest way to envision a S&P500 level of 100 is in a "negative earnings" environment.  When the original article was written, this "negative earnings" (i.e. a loss) for the S&P500 seemed like a possibility.  Now, with consensus 2010 earnings (on an "operating basis") estimates of $80-$85/share, with increases projected for 2011, such a "loss" scenario would seem highly improbable.

However, as I noted in the original article, "...since the financial crisis began, outliers and other “odd occurrences” have propagated on a vast scale.  The mere existence of such an array of outliers would seem to argue that one should be open to possibilities that normally one wouldn’t, or shouldn’t seriously consider possible. "  Many have ignored these outliers and "odd occurrences," which I believe is a critical mistake.  These outliers and "odd occurrences" are numerous, and many have been mentioned in this blog; perhaps most noticeable among these outliers is outsized unemployment that is proving rather intractable.

As I wrote in the June 29 post, "it behooves us to at least condider whether instead we are in a continuing Depression, as I have previously written."  If one does believe this is a Depression - in which current economic strength is of a transitory manner - the ramifications of such are important, as it would indicate that not only is more weakness coming, but most likely of a more (vs. the trough of 2009) severe nature.

My analysis indicates that our current and future economic conditions are of great complexity.  At the core of any current economic analysis and forecast should be the question "Are our current national actions to improve our economic condition leading to that of sustainable prosperity?"  From an "all things considered basis" I do not believe so, unfortunately.

As to whether a S&P500 level of 100 is forthcoming - I continue to believe in the following, which I stated in a September 1, 2009 post:  "Since I wrote the article “A S&P500 Target of 100?” discussed in the last post of that Depression series I have used the S&P500 price of 100 as a type of potential endpost, and have been thinking of what type of probabilities to assign to its likelihood of occurring in the near future (a  two-year window since it was written).  Most people would think that such a price target is simply impossible.  However, since I wrote the article in early March, the probabilities I have assigned to it have increased, unfortunately."

back to home

SPX at 1095.34 as this post is written

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

The Continual Comparisons To The Great Depression

On Friday, The Wall Street Journal had an article titled "Why This Isn't Like 1938 - At Least Not Yet."

Ever since the onset of the "Financial Crisis" there has been a continual flow of comparisons of our current economic situation to that of  The Great Depression.

Last year I wrote about these comparisons on numerous occasions.  I summarized these posts in a July 13, 2009 post.  As I said in that post, "...although our current period of economic weakness does have similarities to that of The Great Depression, there are notable differences as well.  To believe that both situations are very similar, and by acting accordingly, imperils our economic situation."

back to home

SPX at 1076.39 as this post is written

Monday, July 12, 2010

ECRI WLI Growth History

For a variety of reasons, I am not as enamored with ECRI's WLI and WLI Growth measures as many are.

However, I do think the measures are important and deserve close monitoring and scrutiny.

Toward that end, I recently came about a July 5 article, found here, from Doug Short that provides a good (and concise) historical perspective and review on ECRI WLI Growth rates.  His charts comparing WLI Growth to GDP and the Fed Funds rate go back to 1965, as shown.

back to home

SPX at 1077.96 as this post is written

Friday, July 9, 2010

The Business Environment

Frequently, one hears of the high profits and large (from a historical perspective) cash positions of companies.  While this may be true more or less, especially among larger companies, I believe that it depicts the current overall business environment in an overly positive light.

As I have written of previously, there are significant problem areas in today's business environment.   While many firms have been able to achieve high profits and cash flow despite these problem areas, the manner in which they have done so is, in many cases, suboptimal.  As well, special circumstances have aided in achieving such profitability.

Of greater concern is how businesses will fare going forward as this economic situation unfolds, especially if one believes as I do that greater economic weakness will be forthcoming.

As I commented in the April 15 post, "I believe that many firms will continue to face very challenging conditions, and many will ultimately fail, unfortunately.  I base this belief on a number of factors including my overall economic assessment as well as business-specific factors."

One reason for this outcome is what appears to be an inability for businesses, in general, to predict adverse economic conditions.  This inability was especially acute during the economic weakness that unfolded during the "financial crisis" of latter 2008 and 2009.  Of course, businesses weren't alone in this inability as virtually all professional economic and financial forecasters also failed to predict such weakness.

Although it is difficult to visualize the extent to which businesses failed to foresee the economic downdraft of 2008, I think that the following chart can be used, at least to some extent, as a proxy of such.  This chart is from the June 29, 2010 commentary and shows the results of the Business Roundtable CEO Survey.  Notable is the elevated reading through mid-2008:

The other issue, aside from whether businesses can predict oncoming economic weakness is whether they can successful adapt to such conditions in a timely fashion.

Of course, there are many remedies and actions companies can take to overcome adverse economic conditions.  However, the availability of these options is predicated by what actions each firm has already taken.

back to home

SPX at 1069.95 as this post is written

Thursday, July 8, 2010

U.S. Dollar Update

This post is an update to posts of March 17 and January 13.

Here is a chart of the U.S. Dollar on a monthly basis since 1983:

(click on image to enlarge chart)
chart courtesy of

On the aforementioned March 17 and January 13 posts, I spoke of numerous reasons to expect, and fear, a U.S. Dollar decline, both from a fundamental and technical perspective.

Subsequent to the March 17 post, the U.S. Dollar rallied into early June, presumably over various economic problems in Europe.

As seen on the above chart, the level reached by the U.S. Dollar in early June, just above 88, is significant in that it is roughly equivalent to that reached in late '08 and early '09.  This, along with other technical analysis measures, leads me to believe that the recent U.S. Dollar peak in early June represented some type of technical "top", and now we are on a decline.

Given our national policies and actions to offset economic weakness, along with the long-term technical perspective of the U.S. Dollar, I continue to believe the U.S. Dollar is highly vulnerable to a substantial decline.

back to home

SPX at 1065.96 as this post is written

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

"That Won't Be Allowed To Happen"

Occasionally I hear "That won't be allowed to happen," which has been said by many prominent people within the political, financial and economic community.  This phrase, in essence, is meant to say that some type of severe economic weakness or other calamitous economic event won't, and can't, occur.

I find this phrase rather mystifying; rarely is it specified as to "whom" will prevent such economic harm from occurring.  Presumably it is the government, Federal Reserve, Congress, the President, or perhaps just fate.

While it may be comforting to believe that adverse economic events "won't be allowed to happen," I don't believe, for a variety of reasons, that the idea reflects reality.

The best way to avoid adverse economic events or circumstances is through effective policy and decision making.

back to home

SPX at 1028.06 as this post is written

Friday, July 2, 2010

misc. note

Just a quick administrative note...

Obviously, changing past posts' content is disingenuous.  However, sometimes it is necessary.  My policy has been, and will continue to be, the following:  I allow myself to change post content on the same day the post is created, to allow for editing, rewording, accuracy, formatting, etc.  After that day, the post will remain "as is", including typos.

However, I will change post content at any time if there are bad links, or obvious factual errors (for example, in a recent post I mentioned a May CFNAI report as representing that of April, which I have corrected.)  Factual errors, to my knowledge, happen very infrequently - the above example is the only error I can recall.

As well, I change post categorization and tags if, in retrospect, they are suboptimal.  This is done to make site usage easier.

Please let me know (via should you encounter bad links or any other problems.

Retail Sales Per Capita Chart

On June 17, had a chart that showed retail sales per capita since 2005.  Total retail sales, as depicted, includes autos and gasoline:

Below the Retail Sales Per Capita is a chart of the S&P Retail Sales Index.

Of course, this view of total retail sales, on a per-capita (factoring in population growth) basis, is not one that is often seen.  I've posted it as I believe that this "per-capita" view is an important one, for many reasons.

SPX at 1027.37 as this post is written

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Business Roundtable Speech Of June 22, 2010

On June 22 Ivan Seidenberg, Chairman of The Business Roundtable, gave a speech (pdf) to the Economic Club of Washington.

Here are some notable speech passages:

"But frankly, we have become somewhat troubled by a growing disconnect between Washington and the business community that is harming our ability to expand the economy and grow private-sector jobs in the U.S. We see a host of laws, regulations and other policies being enacted that impose a government prescription of how individual industries ought to be structured, rather than produce an environment in which the private sector can innovate, invest and create jobs in this modern global economy."


"In the search for short-term revenue fixes, we’re doing long-term damage to growth.

By reaching into virtually every sector of economic life, government is injecting uncertainty into the marketplace and making it harder to raise capital and create new businesses."

back to home

SPX at 1030.71 as this post is written