Tuesday, March 25, 2025

Money Supply Charts Through February 2025

For reference purposes, below are two sets of charts depicting growth in the money supply.

The first shows the M1, defined in FRED as the following:

Before May 2020, M1 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) demand deposits at commercial banks (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; and (3) other checkable deposits (OCDs), consisting of negotiable order of withdrawal, or NOW, and automatic transfer service, or ATS, accounts at depository institutions, share draft accounts at credit unions, and demand deposits at thrift institutions.

Beginning May 2020, M1 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) demand deposits at commercial banks (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; and (3) other liquid deposits, consisting of OCDs and savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts). Seasonally adjusted M1 is constructed by summing currency, demand deposits, and OCDs (before May 2020) or other liquid deposits (beginning May 2020), each seasonally adjusted separately.

Here is the “M1 Money Stock” (seasonally adjusted) chart, updated on March 25, 2025 depicting data through February 2025, with a value of $18,531.3 Billion:

M1SL

Here is the “M1 Money Stock” chart on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis, with a current value of 3.0%:

M1SL Percent Change From Year Ago

Data Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), M1 Money Stock [M1SL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 25, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1SL

The second set shows M2, defined in FRED as the following:

Before May 2020, M2 consists of M1 plus (1) savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts); (2) small-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement account (IRA) and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and (3) balances in retail money market funds (MMFs) less IRA and Keogh balances at MMFs.

Beginning May 2020, M2 consists of M1 plus (1) small-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) less IRA and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and (2) balances in retail MMFs less IRA and Keogh balances at MMFs. Seasonally adjusted M2 is constructed by summing savings deposits (before May 2020), small-denomination time deposits, and retail MMFs, each seasonally adjusted separately, and adding this result to seasonally adjusted M1.

Here is the “M2 Money Stock” (seasonally adjusted) chart, updated on March 25, 2025, depicting data through February 2025, with a value of $21,671.0 Billion:

M2SL

Here is the “M2 Money Stock” chart on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis, with a current value of 3.9%:

M2SL Percent Change From Year Ago

Data Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), M2 Money Stock [M2SL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 25, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2SL

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5767.26 as this post is written

House Prices Reference Chart

As a reference for long-term house price index trends, below is a chart, updated with the most current data (through January 2025) from the CalculatedRisk blog post of March 25, 2025 titled “Case-Shiller : National House Price Index…“:

house price indexes

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I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5764.06 as this post is written

Monday, March 24, 2025

Updates Of Economic Indicators March 2025

The following is an update of various indicators that are supposed to predict and/or depict economic activity. These indicators have been discussed in previous blog posts:

The March 2025 Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) updated as of March 24, 2025:

The CFNAI, with a current reading of .18:

CFNAI

source:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed National Activity Index [CFNAI], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 24, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CFNAI

The CFNAI-MA3, with a current reading of .15:

CFNAIMA3

source:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed National Activity Index: Three Month Moving Average [CFNAIMA3], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 24, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CFNAIMA3

The Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions (ADS) Index

The ADS Index as of March 20, 2025, reflecting data from March 1, 1960 through March 15, 2025, with last value .25341:

ADS Index

The Conference Board Leading Economic Index (LEI), Coincident Economic Index (CEI), and Lagging Economic Index (LAG):

As per the March 20, 2025 Conference Board press release the LEI was 101.1 in February, the CEI was 114.7 in February, and the LAG was 119.1 in February.

An excerpt from the release:

“The US LEI fell again in February and continues to point to headwinds ahead,” said Justyna Zabinska-La Monica, Senior Manager, Business Cycle Indicators, at The Conference Board. “Consumers’ expectations of future business conditions turned more pessimistic. That was the component that weighed down most heavily on the Index in February. Manufacturing new orders, which improved in January, retreated and were the second largest negative contributor to the Index’s monthly decline. On a positive note, the LEI’s six-month and annual growth rates, while still negative, have remained on an upward trend since the end of 2023, suggesting that headwinds in the economy as of February may have moderated compared to last year. However, given substantial policy uncertainty and the notable pullback in consumer sentiment and spending since the beginning of the year, we currently forecast that real GDP growth in the US will slow to around 2.0% in 2025.”

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5760.43 as this post is written

The U.S. Economic Situation – March 24, 2025 Update

Perhaps the main reason that I write of our economic situation is that I continue to believe, based upon various analyses, that our economic situation is in many ways misunderstood.  While no one likes to contemplate a future rife with economic adversity, current and future economic problems must be properly recognized and rectified if high-quality, sustainable long-term economic vitality is to be realized.

There are an array of indications and other “warning signs” – many readily apparent – that current economic activity and financial market performance is accompanied by exceedingly perilous dynamics.

I have written extensively about this peril, including in the following:

Building Financial Danger” (ongoing updates)

My analyses continues to indicate that the growing level of financial danger will lead to the next stock market crash that will also involve (as seen in 2008) various other markets as well.  Key attributes of this next crash is its outsized magnitude (when viewed from an ultra-long term historical perspective) and the resulting economic impact.  This next financial crash is of tremendous concern, as my analyses indicate it will lead to a Super Depression – i.e. an economy characterized by deeply embedded, highly complex, and difficult-to-solve problems.

For long-term reference purposes, here is a chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average since 1900, depicted on a monthly basis using a LOG scale (updated through March 21, 2025 with a last value of 41,985.35):

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

DJIA since 1900

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5743.32 as this post is written

Thursday, March 20, 2025

Jerome Powell’s March 19, 2024 Press Conference – Notable Aspects

On Wednesday, March 19, 2025 FOMC Chair Jerome Powell gave his scheduled March 2025 FOMC Press Conference. (link of video and related materials)

Below are Jerome Powell’s comments I found most notable – although I don’t necessarily agree with them – in the order they appear in the transcript.  These comments are excerpted from the “Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference“ (preliminary)(pdf) of March 19, 2025, with the accompanying “FOMC Statement” and “Summary of Economic Projections” (pdf) dated March 19, 2025.

Excerpts from Chair Powell’s opening comments:

Inflation has eased significantly over the past two years but remains somewhat elevated relative to our 2 percent longer-run goal.  Estimates based on the Consumer Price Index and other data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.5 percent over the 12 months ending in February and that, excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.8 percent.  Some near-term measures of inflation expectations have recently moved up.  We see this in both market- and survey-based measures, and survey respondents, both consumers and businesses, are mentioning tariffs as a driving factor.  Beyond the next year or so, however, most measures of longer-term expectations remain consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.  The median projection in the SEP for total PCE inflation is 2.7 percent this year and 2.2 percent next year, a little higher than projected in December.  In 2027, the median projection is at our 2 percent objective.  

Our monetary policy actions are guided by our dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people.  At today’s meeting, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent.  Looking ahead, the new Administration is in the process of implementing significant policy changes in four distinct areas: trade, immigration, fiscal policy, and regulation.  It is the net effect of these policy changes that will matter for the economy and for the path of monetary policy.  While there have been recent developments in some of these areas, especially trade policy, uncertainty around the changes and their effects on the economic outlook is high.  As we parse the incoming information, we are focused on separating the signal from the noise as the outlook evolves.  As we say in our statement, in considering the extent and timing of additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.  We do not need to be in a hurry to adjust our policy stance, and we are well positioned to wait for greater clarity. 

Excerpts of Jerome Powell’s responses as indicated to various questions:

COLBY SMITH.  Thank you, Colby Smith with the New York Times. You just described inflation expectations as well-anchored, but has your confidence in that assessment changed at all, given the increase in certain measures and the high degree of uncertainty expressed by businesses, households, and forecasters? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So, when inflation expectations, of course, we do monitor inflation expectations very, very carefully, in basically every source we can find, and you know, shortterm, long-term, households, businesses, forecasters, market based. And I think the picture broadly is this, you do see increases widely in short-term inflation expectations, and people who fill out surveys and answer, you know, questionnaires, are pointing to tariffs about that. If you look — in the survey world, if you look a little further out, you really, you really don’t see much in the way of an increased longer-term expectation. Inflation expectations are mostly well anchored. If you look at the New York, for example, then you have market based, and it’s the same pattern, you know, people in markets are pricing in and break-evens, some higher inflation over the next year, must be related to tariffs. We know from the surveys. But if you look out five years, or five-year, five year, forward, you’ll see that break-evens have, are either flat or actually slightly down in the case of a longer-term one. So, we look at that, and we will be watching all of it very, very carefully. We do not take anything for granted, that’s at the very heart of our framework, anchored inflation expectations, but that’s what you see right now. 

COLBY SMITH.  And how much weight do you put on the deterioration in consumer confidence surveys? You said recently that this is perhaps not the best indication of future spending, but I’m curious, you know, what you think is behind this deterioration and to what extent it could be a leading indicator for hard data?

CHAIR POWELL.  So, let’s start with the hard data. You know, we do see pretty solid hard data still. So, growth looks like it’s maybe moderating a bit, consumer spending moderating a bit, but still at a solid pace. Unemployment’s 4.1 percent, job creation most recently has been at a healthy level. Inflation has started to move up now, we think partly in response to tariffs and there may be a delay in further progress over the course of this year. So, that’s the hard data. Overall, it’s a solid picture. The survey data, of both household and businesses, show significant rise in uncertainty and significant concerns about downside risks. So how do we think about that? And that’s the, that is the question, as I mentioned the other day, as you pointed out, the relationship between survey data and actual economic activity hasn’t been very tight, there have been plenty of times where people are saying very downbeat things about the economy and then going out and buying a new car. But we don’t know that that will be the case here. We will be watching very carefully for signs of weakness in the real data. Of course we will. But I, you know, given where we are, we think our policy is in a good place to react to what comes, and we think that the right thing to do is to wait here for, you know, for greater clarity about what the economy is doing. 

also:

KELLY O’GRADY. Thanks for taking our questions, Chair Powell. Kelly O’Grady, CBS News. So consumer sentiment has dipped dramatically but you say the economy and the hard data is still solid. What is your message to consumers that clearly disagree and don’t feel that strength? Because the hard data they’re looking at is their grocery bill. 

CHAIR POWELL. Okay, so a couple things, the grocery bill is about past inflation, really. There was inflation in ’21, two, and three, and prices went up. The current level, it’s not the change in prices, it’s they’re unhappy, and they’re not wrong to be unhappy, that prices went up quite a bit and they’re paying a lot for those things. So that’s, I think that is the fundamental fact and has been for a long time, a couple years, why people are unhappy with the economy. It’s not that the economy is not growing, it’s not that inflation is really high, it’s not that unemployment is high. It’s none of those things. We have, you know, 4.1 percent unemployment, we’ve got 2 percent growth, and you know, it’s a pretty good economy. But, people are unhappy because of the price level. And I do, we completely understand and accept that. 

KELLY O’GRADY. And just to follow-up, why are you still projecting two rate cuts this year if your own projections show inflation higher for longer? Does that mean you see a slowdown in economic growth as a real threat? 

CHAIR POWELL. So, I think if you, yeah, I mean, remember we came into this with, at the December meeting, and the median was two cuts, the median was. And so you come in and you see, broadly speaking, weaker growth but higher inflation. And they kind of balance each other out, so you think, and unemployment is really, really only a 1/10 change. So it’s, there’s just not a big change in the forecast. There really isn’t. Modest, you know, meaningfully higher — sorry, growth, and meaningfully higher inflation, which call for different responses. Right? So, they cancel each other out and people just said, okay, I’m going to stay here. But the second factor is, it’s so highly uncertain, is just, you know, we’re sitting here thinking, and we obviously are in touch with businesses and households all over the country. We have an extraordinary network of contacts that come in through the reserve banks and put it in the Beige Book, and also through contacts at the Board. And we get all that, and we do understand that sentiment has fallen off pretty sharply, but economic activity has not yet. And so we’re watching carefully, so I would tell people that the economy seems to be, seems to be healthy. We understand that sentiment is quite negative at this time, and that probably has to do with, you know, turmoil at the beginning of an administration. It’s making, you know, big changes in areas of policy. And that’s probably part of it. I do think the underlying unhappiness people have about the economy though is more, is more about the price level. 

also:

SIMON RABINOVITCH. Simon Rabinovitch with the Economist. Thank you Chair Powell. Several times today you said that you feel you’re well-positioned to wait for greater clarity. At the same time, you could point to quite a few growth risks at the moment. We’ve seen a stock market that’s gone quite wobbly, rapidly cooling housing sales, plunging confidence surveys. Today, not only did the SEP mark down the growth outlook 17 of 19 see risks to the downside. So my question is, how confident are you that you’re well-positioned? Or is that one more thing that you’re uncertain about? 

CHAIR POWELL. I’m confident that we’re well-positioned in the sense that we’re wellpositioned to move in the direction we’ll need to move. I mean I, I don’t know anyone who has a lot of confidence in their forecast. I mean the point is, we are — we are at, you know, we’re at a place where we can cut, or we can hold, what is a clearly a restrictive stance, of policy. And that’s what I mean. I mean I think we’re — that’s well-positioned. Forecasting right now, it’s you know, forecasting is always very, very hard, and in the current situation, I just think it’s uncertainty is remarkably high. 

SIMON RABINOVITCH. And sorry, standing here today, would you be surprised to pivot back towards rate cuts in May? 

CHAIR POWELL. I think we’re not going to be in any hurry to move, and as I mentioned, I think we’re well-positioned to wait for further clarity. And not in any hurry. 

also:

JENNIFER SCHONBERGER. Jennifer Schonberger with Yahoo Finance. As you look to navigate higher inflation and lower growth, the Fed has talked about heeding the lessons from the 1970s. Is the Fed willing to have a recession if it means breaking the back of inflation? 

CHAIR POWELL. Well, fortunately, we’re in a situation where we have seen inflation move down from, you know, higher levels to pretty close to 2 percent, while the unemployment rate has remained very consistent with full employment, 4.1 percent. So, we now have inflation coming in from an exogenous source, but the underlying inflationary picture before that was, you know, basically 2 and 1/2 percent inflation I would say. And 2 percent growth, and 4 percent unemployment. So that’s what, that’s what we did together, the economy accomplished. So, I don’t see any reason to think that we’re looking at a replay of the ’70s or anything like that. You know, inflation, underlying inflation is, you know, still running in the twos, with probably a little bit of a pickup associated with tariffs. So I don’t think we’re facing, I wouldn’t say we’re in a situation that’s remotely comparable to that. 

JENNIFER SCHONBERGER. And last month the idea of a DOGE dividend was proposed, which would send $5,000 checks to every taxpayer from DOGE savings. President Trump and Elon Musk have supported this. There’s reports there could be a bill introduced on Capitol Hill. What impact might that have on household savings and spending, in terms of your growth and outlook for inflation? 

CHAIR POWELL. You know, it’s not appropriate for me to speculate on political ideas or fiscal policy for that matter. So, I’m going to, I’m going to pass on that one. Thank you.  

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5698.94 as this post is written

Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)

The St. Louis Fed’s Financial Stress Index (STLFSI4) is one index that is supposed to measure stress in the financial system. Its reading as of the March 20, 2025 update (reflecting data through March 14, 2025) is -.2264:

STLFSI4

source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index [STLFSI4], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 20, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI4

Of course, there are a variety of other measures and indices that are supposed to measure financial stress and other related issues, both from the Federal Reserve as well as from private sources.

Two other indices that I regularly monitor include the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) as well as the Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI).

Here are summary descriptions of each, as seen in FRED:

The National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) measures risk, liquidity and leverage in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as in the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Positive values of the NFCI indicate financial conditions that are tighter than average, while negative values indicate financial conditions that are looser than average.

The adjusted NFCI (ANFCI). This index isolates a component of financial conditions uncorrelated with economic conditions to provide an update on how financial conditions compare with current economic conditions.

For further information, please visit the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s web site:

http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/nfci/index.cfm

Below are the most recently updated charts of the NFCI and ANFCI, respectively.

The NFCI chart below was last updated on March 19, 2025 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through March 14, 2025 on a weekly basis.  The March 14 value is -.54589:

NFCI

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 20, 2025:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCI

The ANFCI chart below was last updated on March 19, 2025 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through March 14, 2025, on a weekly basis.  The March 14 value is -.55462:

ANFCI

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed March 20, 2025:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ANFCI

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5710.88 as this post is written

Tuesday, March 18, 2025

Trends Of S&P500 Earnings Forecasts

S&P500 earnings trends and estimates are a notably important topic, for a variety of reasons, at this point in time.

FactSet publishes a report titled “Earnings Insight” that contains a variety of information including the trends and expectations of S&P500 earnings.

For reference purposes, here are two charts as seen in the “Earnings Insight” report of March 14, 2025:

from page 30:

(click on charts to enlarge images)

S&P500 EPS

from page 31:

S&P500 EPS 2015-2026

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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5618.29 as this post is written

Monday, March 17, 2025

S&P500 EPS Forecasts For 2024-2026 As Of March 14, 2025

As many are aware, Refinitiv publishes earnings estimates for the S&P500.  (My other posts concerning S&P earnings estimates can be found under the S&P500 Earnings label)

The following estimates are from Exhibit 24 of the “S&P500 Earnings Scorecard” (pdf) of March 14, 2025, and represent an aggregation of individual S&P500 component “bottom up” analyst forecasts.  For reference, the Year 2014 value is $118.78/share; the Year 2015 value is $117.46/share; the Year 2016 value is $118.10/share; the Year 2017 value is $132.00/share; the Year 2018 value is $161.93/share; the Year 2019 value is $162.93/share; the Year 2020 value is $139.72/share; the year 2021 value is $208.12/share; the year 2022 value is $218.09/share; and the year 2023 value is $221.36/share:

Year 2024 estimate:

$243.72/share

Year 2025 estimate:

$270.47/share

Year 2026 estimate:

$308.87/share

_____

I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5675.12 as this post is written