Friday, May 16, 2025

Philadelphia Fed – 2nd Quarter 2025 Survey Of Professional Forecasters

The Philadelphia Fed 2nd Quarter 2025 Survey of Professional Forecasters was released on May 16, 2025.  This survey is somewhat unique in various regards, such as it incorporates a longer time frame for various measures.

The survey shows, among many measures, the following median expectations:

Real GDP: (annual average level)

full-year 2025:  1.4%

full-year 2026:  1.6%

full-year 2027:  2.2%

full-year 2028:  2.0%

Unemployment Rate: (annual average level)

for 2025: 4.3%

for 2026: 4.5%

for 2027: 4.6%

for 2028: 4.4%

Regarding the risk of a negative quarter in real GDP in any of the next few quarters, mean estimates are 37.0%, 36.1%, 33.9%, 28.5% and 25.0% for each of the quarters from Q2 2025 through Q2 2026, respectively.

As well, there are also a variety of time frames shown (present quarter through the year 2034) with the median expected inflation (annualized) of each.  Inflation is measured in Headline and Core CPI and Headline and Core PCE.  Over all time frames expectations are shown to be in the 2.1% to 3.8% range.

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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5958.38 as this post is written

Trends Of S&P500 Earnings Forecasts

S&P500 earnings trends and estimates are a notably important topic, for a variety of reasons, at this point in time.

FactSet publishes a report titled “Earnings Insight” that contains a variety of information including the trends and expectations of S&P500 earnings.

For reference purposes, here are two charts as seen in the “Earnings Insight” report of May 16, 2025:

from page 32:

(click on charts to enlarge images)

S&P500 EPS forecast

from page 33:

S&P500 EPS

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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5958.38 as this post is written

S&P500 EPS Forecasts For 2024-2027 As Of May 9, 2025

As many are aware, Refinitiv publishes earnings estimates for the S&P500.  (My other posts concerning S&P earnings estimates can be found under the S&P500 Earnings label)

The following estimates are from Exhibit 24 of the “S&P500 Earnings Scorecard” (pdf) of May 9, 2025, and represent an aggregation of individual S&P500 component “bottom up” analyst forecasts.  For reference, the Year 2014 value is $118.78/share; the Year 2015 value is $117.46/share; the Year 2016 value is $118.10/share; the Year 2017 value is $132.00/share; the Year 2018 value is $161.93/share; the Year 2019 value is $162.93/share; the Year 2020 value is $139.72/share; the year 2021 value is $208.12/share; the year 2022 value is $218.09/share; the year 2023 value is $221.36/share; and the year 2024 value is $242.73/share:

Year 2025 estimate:

$264.56/share

Year 2026 estimate:

$300.66/share

Year 2027 estimate:

$340.47/share

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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5916.93 as this post is written

Thursday, May 15, 2025

Standard & Poor’s S&P500 EPS Estimates 2025 – 2026 – May 9, 2025

As many are aware, Standard & Poor’s publishes earnings estimates for the S&P500.  (My posts concerning their estimates can be found under the S&P500 Earnings label)

For reference purposes, the most current estimates are reflected below, and are as of May 9, 2025:

Year 2025 estimates add to the following:

-From a “bottom up” perspective, operating earnings of $257.91/share

-From a “bottom up” perspective, “as reported” earnings of $241.33/share

Year 2026 estimates add to the following:

-From a “bottom up” perspective, operating earnings of $298.15/share

-From a “bottom up” perspective, “as reported” earnings of $276.88/share

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I post various economic forecasts because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not agree with many of the consensus estimates and much of the commentary in these forecast surveys.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5916.93 as this post is written

Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)

The St. Louis Fed’s Financial Stress Index (STLFSI4) is one index that is supposed to measure stress in the financial system. Its reading as of the May 15, 2025 update (reflecting data through May 9, 2025) is -.4793:

STLFSI4

source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index [STLFSI4], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 15, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI4

Of course, there are a variety of other measures and indices that are supposed to measure financial stress and other related issues, both from the Federal Reserve as well as from private sources.

Two other indices that I regularly monitor include the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) as well as the Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI).

Here are summary descriptions of each, as seen in FRED:

The National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) measures risk, liquidity and leverage in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as in the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Positive values of the NFCI indicate financial conditions that are tighter than average, while negative values indicate financial conditions that are looser than average.

The adjusted NFCI (ANFCI). This index isolates a component of financial conditions uncorrelated with economic conditions to provide an update on how financial conditions compare with current economic conditions.

For further information, please visit the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s web site:

http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/nfci/index.cfm

Below are the most recently updated charts of the NFCI and ANFCI, respectively.

The NFCI chart below was last updated on May 14, 2025 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through May 9, 2025 on a weekly basis.  The May 9 value is -.51219:

NFCI

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 9, 2025:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCI

The ANFCI chart below was last updated on May 14, 2025 incorporating data from January 8, 1971 through May 9, 2025, on a weekly basis.  The May 9 value is -.57453:

ANFCI

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 15, 2025:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ANFCI

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I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5916.23 as this post is written

Thursday, May 8, 2025

Jerome Powell’s May 7, 2025 Press Conference – Notable Aspects

On Wednesday, May 7, 2025 FOMC Chair Jerome Powell gave his scheduled May 2025 FOMC Press Conference. (link of video and related materials)

Below are Jerome Powell’s comments I found most notable – although I don’t necessarily agree with them – in the order they appear in the transcript.  These comments are excerpted from the “Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference“ (preliminary)(pdf) of May 7, 2025, with the accompanying “FOMC Statement.”

Excerpts from Chair Powell’s opening comments:

In support of our goals, today the Federal Open Market Committee decided to leave our policy interest rate unchanged.  The risks of higher unemployment and higher inflation appear to have risen, and we believe that the current stance of monetary policy leaves us well positioned to respond in a timely way to potential economic developments.  I will have more to say about monetary policy after briefly reviewing economic developments.

Following growth of 2.5 percent last year, GDP was reported to have edged down in the first quarter, reflecting swings in net exports that were likely driven by businesses bringing in imports ahead of potential tariffs.  This unusual swing complicated GDP measurement last quarter. Private domestic final purchases, or PDFP—which excludes net exports, inventory investment, and government spending—grew at a solid 3 percent rate in the first quarter, the same as last year’s pace.  Within PDFP, growth of consumer spending moderated while investment in equipment and intangibles rebounded from weakness in the fourth quarter.  Surveys of households and businesses, however, report a sharp decline in sentiment and elevated uncertainty about the economic outlook, largely reflecting trade policy concerns.  It remains to be seen how these developments might affect future spending and investment.  

also:

Inflation has eased significantly from its highs in mid-2022 but remains somewhat elevated relative to our 2 percent longer-run goal.  Total PCE prices rose 2.3 percent over the 12 months ending in March; excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.6 percent.  Near-term measures of inflation expectations have moved up, as reflected in both market- and survey-based measures.  Survey respondents, including consumers, businesses, and professional forecasters, point to tariffs as the driving factor.  Beyond the next year or so, however, most measures of longer-term expectations remain consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.

Our monetary policy actions are guided by our dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people.  At today’s meeting, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent and to continue reducing the size of our balance sheet.  

Excerpts of Jerome Powell’s responses as indicated to various questions:

NICK TIMIRAOS.  Nick Timiraos for The Wall Street Journal. Chair Powell, there’s naturally a lot of [inaudible] around 2021 in supply shocks. But there are some who argue that the current situation has notable differences, energy costs are down, housing imbalances look nothing like they did four years ago, labor demand appears to be gradually cooling with wage growth running below four percent. What do you see right now that could nourish higher inflation beyond a rise in goods prices this year? 

CHAIR POWELL.  I think the underlying inflation picture is good, it’s what you see, which is inflation now running a bit above two percent. And we’ve had basically decent readings in housing services and non-housing services, which is a big part of it. So that part, I think is moving along well. But there’s just so much that we don’t know. I think — and we’re in a good position to wait and see, is the thing, we don’t have to be in a hurry. The economy is — has been resilient and is doing fairly well. Our policy is well positioned, the cost of waiting to see further are fairly low, we think. So that’s what we’re doing. And you know, we’ll see the Administration is entering into negotiations with many countries over tariffs. We’ll know more with each week and month that goes by where — about where tariffs are going to land — you know, land, and we’ll know what the effects will be when we start to see those things. So, we think we’ll be learning. I can’t tell you how long it will take. But for now, it does seem like it’s a fairly clear decision for us to wait and see and watch. 

NICK TIMIRAOS.  So when you say that you don’t need to be in a hurry, does that mean that — could the outlook change in such a way that a change in your stance could be warranted as soon as your next meeting? 

CHAIR POWELL. You know, as I said, we’re — we are comfortable with our policy stance. We think the right — we’re in the right place to wait and see how things evolve. We don’t feel like we need to be in a hurry. We feel like it’s appropriate to be patient. And you know, when things develop — of course we have a record of — we can move quickly when that’s appropriate. But we think right now the appropriate thing to do is to wait and see how things evolve. There’s so much uncertainty. If you talk to businesses, or market participants, or forecasters, everyone is just waiting to see how developments play out, and then we’ll be able to make a better assessment of what the appropriate path for a monetary policy is. So we’re not in that place, and you know, as that develops — and I can’t really give you a timeframe on that.

also:

HOWARD SCHNEIDER.  Well, let me press you on this side of the economy being fine right now, because reading the Beige Book very closely the last time around there was a lot of, you know, negative stuff, negative sentiment that was in there. And I know that everybody’s looking at soft data right now. You mentioned it yourself that the sentiment’s sour. But the Beige Book was talking about, you know, the beginnings of layoffs in some industries, prices rising in some places, and an awful lot of investment decisions being pushed to the sideline. Doesn’t that point to a slowdown? 

CHAIR POWELL.  It may well. It just hasn’t shown up yet. And you know, we all look at all these sentiments and read many, many individual comments just to get a better feel. And you know, businesses and households very broadly are concerned and, you know, postponing economic decisions of various kinds. And yes, if that continues and nothing happens to sort of alleviate those concerns, then you would expect that to begin to show up in economic data. It wouldn’t maybe show up overnight, but it would show up over weeks and months. And that may be what happens, but it hasn’t happened yet. And also, there are things that can happen that will change that narrative. I mean, they haven’t happened, but it’s possible to imagine things. But in the meantime, yes, we’re watching it extremely carefully like everyone is, but don’t see really much evidence of it in the actual economic data yet. And by the way, consumers keep spending, credit card spending. It’s — you know, it’s still a healthy economy, albeit one that is shrouded in some very downbeat sentiment on the part of people and businesses. 

also:

COURTENAY BROWN. Thank you, Courtenay Brown from Axios. I guess, you know, we talked about some of the indications of potential layoffs, price hikes, an economic slowdown, all being evident in the soft data. I’m curious why the Fed needs to wait for that to translate into hard data to, you know, make any type of monetary policy decision, especially if the hard data is not as timely or might be warped by tariff-related effects. Are you worried that the soft data might be some sort of false warning?

CHAIR POWELL. No. I mean, it’s — look, the — look at the state of the economies. The labor market is solid, inflation is low. We can afford to be patient as things unfold. There’s no real cost to our waiting at this point. Also, the sense of it is we’re not sure what the right thing will be. You know, there should be some increase in inflation, there should be some increase in unemployment. Those call for different responses. And so until we know — potentially call for different responses. And so you know, until we know more, we have the ability to wait and see. And it seems to be a pretty clear decision. Everyone on the committee supported waiting. And so that’s why we’re waiting.

COURTENAY BROWN. Just a very quick follow-up, there was this sort of vibe session, if you will, where the sentiments expressed in soft data did not translate into the hard economic data. Are you — how are you thinking about that when interpreting some of the signs in the softer survey data? 

CHAIR POWELL. You know, I think going back a number of years, the link between sentiment data and consumer spending has been weak. It’s not been a strong link at all. On the other hand, we haven’t had a move of this, you know, speed and size. So it wouldn’t be the case that we’re looking at this and just completely dismissing it. But it’s another reason to wait and see. You’re right that we had a couple of years during the pandemic where people were saying — just very downbeat surveys and going out and spending money. So that can happen and that may happen to some degree here. We just don’t know. This is an outsized change in sentiment, though, and so none of us are looking at this and saying that we’re sure one way or the other. We’re not. 

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5705.05 as this post is written

Building Financial Danger – May 8, 2025 Update

My overall analysis indicates a continuing elevated and growing level of financial danger which contains many worldwide and U.S.-specific “stresses” of a very complex nature. I have written numerous posts on this site concerning both ongoing and recent “negative developments.”  These developments, as well as other exceedingly problematical conditions, have presented a highly perilous economic environment that endangers the overall financial system.

Also of ongoing immense importance is the existence of various immensely large asset bubbles, a subject of which I have extensively written.  While all of these asset bubbles are wildly pernicious and will have profound adverse future implications, hazards presented by the bond market bubble are especially notable.

Predicting the specific timing and extent of a stock market crash is always difficult, and the immense complexity of today’s economic situation makes such a prediction even more challenging. With that being said, my analyses continue to indicate that a near-term exceedingly large (from an ultra long-term perspective) stock market crash – that would also involve (as seen in 2008) various other markets – will occur. [note: the “next crash” and its aftermath has paramount significance and implications, as discussed in the post of January 6, 2012 titled “The Next Crash And Its Significance“ and various subsequent posts in the “Economic Depression” label]

As reference, below is a daily chart since 2008 of the S&P500 (through May 7, 2025 with a last price of 5631.28), depicted on a LOG scale, indicating both the 50dma and 200dma as well as price labels:

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com; chart creation and annotation by the author)

S&P500 since 2008

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5631.28 as this post is written

Monday, May 5, 2025

Recession Probability Models – May 2025

There are a variety of economic models that are supposed to predict the probabilities of recession.

While I don’t agree with the methodologies employed or probabilities of impending economic weakness as depicted by the following two models, I think the results of these models should be monitored.

Please note that each of these models is updated regularly, and the results of these – as well as other recession models – can fluctuate significantly.

The first is the “Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator” from the New York Federal Reserve.  I wrote a post concerning this measure on March 1, 2010, titled “The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator.”

Currently (last updated May 5, 2025 using data through April 2025) this “Yield Curve” model shows a 30.4489% probability of a recession in the United States twelve months ahead.  For comparison purposes, it showed a 30.2198% probability through March 2025, and a chart going back to 1960 is seen at the “Probability Of U.S. Recession Predicted by Treasury Spread.” (pdf)

The second model is from Marcelle Chauvet and Jeremy Piger.  This model is described on the St. Louis Federal Reserve site (FRED) as follows:

Smoothed recession probabilities for the United States are obtained from a dynamic-factor markov-switching model applied to four monthly coincident variables: non-farm payroll employment, the index of industrial production, real personal income excluding transfer payments, and real manufacturing and trade sales. This model was originally developed in Chauvet, M., “An Economic Characterization of Business Cycle Dynamics with Factor Structure and Regime Switching,” International Economic Review, 1998, 39, 969-996. (http://faculty.ucr.edu/~chauvet/ier.pdf)

Additional details and explanations can be seen on the “U.S. Recession Probabilities” page.

This model, last updated on May 1, 2025 currently shows a .84% probability using data through March 2025.

Here is the FRED chart:

Smoothed U.S. Recession Probabilities

Data Source:  Piger, Jeremy Max and Chauvet, Marcelle, Smoothed U.S. Recession Probabilities [RECPROUSM156N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed May 5, 2025:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RECPROUSM156N

The two models featured above can be compared against measures seen in recent posts.  For instance, as seen in the April 13, 2025 post titled “The April 2025 Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey“ economists surveyed averaged a 45% probability of a U.S. recession within the next 12 months.

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5672.99 as this post is written

Charts Indicating Economic Weakness – May 2025

Throughout this site there are many discussions of economic indicators.  This post is the latest in a series of posts indicating facets of U.S. economic weakness or a notably low growth rate.

The level and trend of economic growth is especially notable at this time. As seen in various sources, recession estimates have been at elevated levels.

As seen in the April 2025 Wall Street Journal Economic Forecast Survey the consensus (average estimate) among various economists is for .78% GDP in 2025, 1.83% GDP in 2026, and 2.12% GDP in 2027.

Charts Indicating U.S. Economic Weakness

Below is a small sampling of charts that depict weak growth or contraction, and a brief comment for each:

University of Louisville and Oklahoma State University: LoDI National Index (LODINIM066N)

The LoDI National Index is described in FRED as:

The LoDI Index uses linear regression analysis to combine cargo volume data from rail, barge, air, and truck transit, along with various economic factors. The resulting indicator is designed to predict upcoming changes in the level of logistics and distribution activity in the US and is represented by a value between 1 and 100. An index at or above 50 represents a healthy level of activity in the industry.

As seen in the long-term chart below, the index appears to have recently peaked.

Shown below is a chart with data through May 2025 (last value of 75.17190), last updated May 1, 2025:

LoDI National Index

Below is this measure displayed on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis with value -.4%:

LoDI National Index Percent Change From Year Ago

source: University of Louisville. Logistics and Distribution Institute and Oklahoma State University, University of Louisville and Oklahoma State University: LoDI National Index [LODINIM066N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 5, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LODINIM066N

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All Employees, Temporary Help Services (TEMPHELPS)

I have written extensively about many facets of employment and unemployment, as the current and future unemployment issue is of tremendous importance yet is in many ways misunderstood.

One theory regarding employment is that hiring cycles typically begin with an uptake in temporary employment. Conversely, due to various factors a reduction in temporary employees can be an (early) indicator of lessening labor demand.

Shown below is this TEMPHELPS measure with last value of 2,542.5 (Thousands) through April 2025, last updated May 2, 2025:

TEMPHELPS

Below is this measure displayed on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis with value -4.6%:

TEMPHELPS Percent Change From Year Ago

source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Temporary Help Services [TEMPHELPS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 5, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TEMPHELPS

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Job Openings (JTSJOL)

Job openings (Job Openings: Total Nonfarm [JTSJOL]), although still at a high level, have recently declined significantly. This “Job Openings” measure had a value of 7,192 (Thousands) through March 2025 as of the April 29, 2024 update, as shown below:

JTSJOL

Below is this measure displayed on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis with value -11.1%:

JTSJOL Percent Change From Year Ago

source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings: Total Nonfarm [JTSJOL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 5, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSJOL

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Vehicle Miles Traveled (TRFVOLUSM227NFWA)

I find the slightly flagging trend in the “Vehicle Miles Traveled” (NSA) measure, when viewed on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis, to be notable.

“Vehicle Miles Traveled” through February had a last value of 237,323 Million.  Shown below is  the measure displayed on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis with value -1.5%, last updated April 14, 2025:

TRFVOLUSM227NFWA Percent Change From Year Ago

source:   U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Vehicle Miles Traveled [TRFVOLUSM227NFWA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed May 5, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TRFVOLUSM227NFWA

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Other Indicators

As mentioned previously, many other indicators discussed on this site indicate weak economic growth or economic contraction, if not outright (gravely) problematical economic conditions.

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The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 5675.54 as this post is written