Thursday, July 31, 2025

Jerome Powell’s July 30, 2025 Press Conference – Notable Aspects

On Wednesday, July 30, 2025 FOMC Chair Jerome Powell gave his schedule July 2025 FOMC Press Conference. (link of video and related materials)

Below are Jerome Powell’s comments I found most notable – although I don’t necessarily agree with them – in the order they appear in the transcript.  These comments are excerpted from the “Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference“ (preliminary)(pdf) of July 30, 2025, with the accompanying “FOMC Statement.”

Excerpts from Chair Powell’s opening comments:

Our monetary policy actions are guided by our dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people.  At today’s meeting, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent and to continue reducing the size of our balance sheet.  We will continue to determine the appropriate stance of monetary policy based on the incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.

Changes to government policies continue to evolve, and their effects on the economy remain uncertain.  Higher tariffs have begun to show through more clearly to prices of some goods, but their overall effects on economic activity and inflation remain to be seen.  A reasonable base case is that the effects on inflation could be short-lived—reflecting a one-time shift in the price level.  But it is also possible that the inflationary effects could instead be more persistent, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed.  

Excerpts of Jerome Powell’s responses as indicated to various questions:

NEIL IRWIN.  Hi, Chairman. Neil with Axios. This morning, we got a GDP report in which final domestic private purchases decelerated, slowest pace since ’22, there was a weakness in the interest-sensitive sectors and residential investment, commercial structures. Are those not signs that monetary policy is a little too restrictive right now given current economic conditions?

CHAIR POWELL.  So, the GDP and PDFP numbers came in pretty much right where we expected them to come in. You’ve got to look at the whole picture. So, certainly, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, economic activity data, GDP, Private Domestic Final Purchases, which we think is a narrower but better signal for future for where the economy is going, has come down to a little better than 1 percent, 1.2 percent I think, in the case of GDP for the first half, whereas it was two and a half last year. So that has certainly come down. But, if you look at the labor market, what you see is by many, many statistics, the labor market is kind of still in balance. It’s things like quits, you know, job openings and let alone the unemployment rate, they’re all very — by many measures, very similar to where they were a year ago. So, you do not see a weakening in the labor market. You do see a slowing in job creation, but also in a slowing – a slowing in the supply of workers. So, you’ve got a labor market that’s in balance, albeit partially because both demand and supply for workers has — is coming down at the same pace and that’s why the unemployment rate has remained roughly stable, which is why I said there — we do see downside risk in the labor market. I mean, our two mandate variables, right, are inflation and maximum employment, stable prices and maximum employment, not so much growth. So, the labor market looks solid, inflation is above target. And, even if you look through the tariff effects, we think it’s still a bit above target. And that’s why our stance is where it is. But, as I mentioned, you know, downside risks to the labor market are certainly apparent. 

NEIL IRWIN.  So, on labor, given the fluid labor supply situation is there a number for this jobs report we get on Friday that would look to you like equilibrium job growth? 

CHAIR POWELL.  You know, the main number you have to look at now is the unemployment rate because, if it’s true that the, you know, demand for workers in the form of, let’s call it — say, payroll jobs, that number has come down, but so has the break even number, kind of in tandem. So, you know, as long as the — that puts the labor market in balance. The fact that it’s getting into balance due to declines in both supply and demand, though, I think does — it is suggestive of downside risk. So, we’re — of course, we’ll be watching that carefully. 

also:

NICK TIMIRAOS.  Nick Timiraos, The Wall Street Journal. Chair Powell, my question is about what have you learned over the last few months about the inflation generating and price pass-through process. And, just to drill down, the June CPI report showed evidence of tariffinduced goods inflation. Now, the tariff landscape is only starting to be settled with some of these more recent deals. Given the lags between when tariffs are announced and when they show up in goods prices, is two months a long enough horizon to evaluate the impact and be confident that tariffs aren’t impacting the broader inflation process? 

CHAIR POWELL.  I think you have to think of this as still quite early days. And so I think what we’re seeing now is substantial amounts of tariff revenue being collected on the order of 30 billion a month, which is, you know, substantially higher than before. And the evidence seems to be mostly not paid, paid only to a small extent through exporters lowering their price and companies or retailers, sort of people who are upstream, institutions that are upstream from the consumer, are paying most of this for now. Consumers are — it’s starting to show up in consumer prices. As you know, in the June report, we expect to see more of that. And we know from surveys that companies feel that they have every intention of — of putting this through to the consumer. But, you know, the truth is they may not be able to in many cases. So I think it’s — we’re just going to have to watch and learn empirically how much of this and over what period of time. I think we have learned that the process will probably be slower than expected at the beginning, but we never expected it to be fast. And we think we have a long way to go to really understand exactly how we’ll be. So that’s how we’re thinking of it right now. 

NICK TIMIRAOS.  So, if I could follow up, is the reticence to look through core goods inflation being driven by the judgment that during the Pandemic expectations proved more adaptive than anyone at the Fed expected? Is it being driven by uncertainty over how restrictive policy is? 

CHAIR POWELL.  You could argue we are a bit looking through goods inflation by not raising rates. You know, we haven’t reacted to new inflation. But, I mean, I wouldn’t insist upon that. But I don’t think — I think the base case, I said — as I said, a reasonable base case is that these are one-time price effects. Of course, in the end, there will not be. This will not turn out to be inflation because we’ll make sure that it’s not. We will, through our tools, make sure that this does not move from being a one-time price increase to serious inflation. We want to do that efficiently, though, efficiently. And that means we want to do it — if you move too soon, you wind up maybe not getting inflation all the way fixed and you have to come back. That’s inefficient. If you move too late, you might do unnecessary damage to the labor market. So, there won’t be, in the end, a big inflationary problem. What we’re trying to do is accomplish that in a way that is efficient. But, in the end, there should be no doubt that we will do what we need to do to keep inflation under control. Ideally, we do it efficiently.

MICHAEL MCKEE.  Michael McKee from Bloomberg Television and Radio. The One Big Bill, leaving aside the adjectives, do you expect it to add stimulus to the economy in 2026? And would that be an argument for remaining on hold or cutting back on the number of rate cuts you would expect for next year? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So, of course, let me just — ritual disclaimer that we don’t express any judgments or anything, right, on fiscal legislation or other legislation for that matter. But I would say, when you think that, you know, the biggest part of the bill was making permanent existing law on taxes, I don’t think we see it as particularly stimulative. There should be some stimulative effect, but it shouldn’t be significant over the next couple of years. 

MICHAEL MCKEE.  And, to follow up, what do you — well, I don’t want to put this in terms of you and the president so let me ask it this way. Do you have concerns about the cost to the government of keeping rates elevated for longer in terms of interest rate charges? 

CHAIR POWELL.  No, that’s — you know, we have a mandate and that’s maximum employment and price stability. And it is — it’s not something we do to consider the cost to the government of our rate changes. We have to be able to look at the goal variables Congress has given us, use the tools they have given us to achieve those goals. And that’s what we do. It’s — we don’t consider the fiscal needs of the federal government. No advanced economy central bank does that. And it wouldn’t be good for — if we did do that, it wouldn’t be good neither for our credibility nor for the credibility of U.S. fiscal policy. So it’s just not something we take into consideration. 

_____

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6364.28 as this post is written

Employment Cost Index (ECI) – June 2025

While the concept of Americans’ incomes can be defined in a number of ways, many prominent measures continue to show disconcerting trends.

One prominent measure is the Employment Cost Index (ECI).

Here is a description from the BLS document titled “The Employment Cost Index:  what is it?“:

The Employment Cost Index (ECI) is a quarterly measure of the change in the price of labor, defined as compensation per employee hour worked. Closely watched by many economists, the ECI is an indicator of cost pressures within companies that could lead to price inflation for finished goods and services. The index measures changes in the cost of compensation not only for wages and salaries, but also for an extensive list of benefits. As a fixed-weight, or Laspeyres, index, the ECI controls for changes occurring over time in the industrial-occupational composition of employment.

On July 31, 2025, the latest ECI report was released.  Here are two excerpts from the BLS release titled “Employment Cost Index – June 2025“:

Compensation costs for civilian workers increased 0.9 percent, seasonally adjusted, for the 3-month period ending in June 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Wages and salaries increased 1.0 percent and benefit costs increased 0.7 percent from March 2025. (See tables A, 1, 2, and 3.)

Compensation costs for civilian workers increased 3.6 percent for the 12-month period ending in June 2025. Wages and salaries increased 3.6 percent for the 12-month period ending in June 2025. Benefit costs increased 3.5 percent for the 12-month period ending in June 2025. (See tables A, 4, 8, and 12.)

Below are three charts, updated on July 31, 2025 that depict various aspects of the ECI, which is seasonally adjusted (SA):

The first depicts the ECI, with a value of 171.395:

ECIALLCIV

source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Cost Index: Total compensation: All Civilian [ECIALLCIV], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed July 31, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECIALLCIV/#

The second chart depicts the ECI on a “Percent Change from Year Ago” basis, with a value of 3.6%:

ECIALLCIV Percent Change From Year Ago

The third chart depicts the ECI on a “Percent Change” (from last quarter) basis, with a value of .9%:

ECIALLCIV Percent Change From Year Ago

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6370.08 as this post is written

Another Recession Probability Indicator – Through Q1 2025

Each month I have been highlighting various estimates of U.S. recession probabilities.  The latest update was that of July 5, 2025, titled “Recession Probability Models – July 2025.”

While I don’t agree with the methodologies employed or the probabilities of impending economic weakness as depicted by these and other estimates, I do believe that the results of these models and estimates should be monitored.

Another probability of recession is provided by James Hamilton, and it is titled “GDP-Based Recession Indicator Index.”  A description of this index, as seen in FRED:

This index measures the probability that the U.S. economy was in a recession during the indicated quarter. It is based on a mathematical description of the way that recessions differ from expansions. The index corresponds to the probability (measured in percent) that the underlying true economic regime is one of recession based on the available data. Whereas the NBER business cycle dates are based on a subjective assessment of a variety of indicators that may not be released until several years after the event , this index is entirely mechanical, is based solely on currently available GDP data and is reported every quarter. Due to the possibility of data revisions and the challenges in accurately identifying the business cycle phase, the index is calculated for the quarter just preceding the most recently available GDP numbers. Once the index is calculated for that quarter, it is never subsequently revised. The value at every date was inferred using only data that were available one quarter after that date and as those data were reported at the time.

If the value of the index rises above 67% that is a historically reliable indicator that the economy has entered a recession. Once this threshold has been passed, if it falls below 33% that is a reliable indicator that the recession is over.

Additional reference sources for this index and its construction can be seen in the Econbrowser post of February 14, 2016 titled “Recession probabilities” as well as on the “The Econbrowser Recession Indicator Index” page.

Below is a chart depicting the most recent value of 11.70000% for the first quarter of 2025, last updated on July 30 (after the July 30, 2025 Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2025 (Advance Estimate)):

JHGDPBRINDX

source:  Hamilton, James, GDP-Based Recession Indicator Index [JHGDPBRINDX], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 31, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JHGDPBRINDX#

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6398.96 as this post is written

Wednesday, July 30, 2025

Velocity Of Money – Charts Updated As Of July 30, 2025

Here are two charts from the St. Louis Fed depicting the velocity of money in terms of the M1 and M2 money supply measures.

All charts reflect quarterly data through the 2nd quarter of 2025, and were last updated as of July 30, 2025.

Velocity of M1 Money Stock, current value = 1.621:

M1V

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 30, 2025:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M1V

Velocity of M2 Money Stock, current value = 1.385:

M2V

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 30, 2025: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M2V

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6384.30 as this post is written

Real GDP Chart Since 1947 – 2nd Quarter 2025

For reference purposes, below is a chart reflecting Real GDP, as depicted, with value $23,685.287.  This chart incorporates the Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2025 (Advance Estimate) of July 30, 2025:

GDPC1

source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product [GDPC1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 30, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6370.86 as this post is written

Friday, July 25, 2025

Durable Goods New Orders – Long-Term Charts Through June 2025

Many people place emphasis on Durable Goods New Orders as a prominent economic indicator and/or leading economic indicator.

For reference, below are two charts depicting this measure.

First, from the St. Louis Fed site (FRED), a chart through June 2025, updated on July 25, 2025. This value is $311,848 ($ Millions):

(click on charts to enlarge images)

DGORDER

Second, here is the chart depicting this measure on a “Percent Change from a Year Ago” basis, with a last value of 10.9%:

DGORDER Percent Change From Year Ago

Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Manufacturers’ New Orders:  Durable Goods [DGORDER]; U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau; accessed July 25, 2025; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGORDER

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6379.33 as this post is written

Updates Of Economic Indicators July 2025

The following is an update of various indicators that are supposed to predict and/or depict economic activity. These indicators have been discussed in previous blog posts:

The July 2025 Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) updated as of June 24, 2025:

The CFNAI, with a current reading of -.10:

CFNAI

source:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed National Activity Index [CFNAI], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 24, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CFNAI

The CFNAI-MA3, with a current reading of -.22:

CFNAIMA3

source:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed National Activity Index: Three Month Moving Average [CFNAIMA3], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 24, 2025: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CFNAIMA3

The Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions (ADS) Index

The ADS Index as of July 24, 2025, reflecting data from March 1, 1960 through July 19, 2025, with last value .106005:

ADS Index

The Conference Board Leading Economic Index (LEI), Coincident Economic Index (CEI), and Lagging Economic Index (LAG):

As per the July 21, 2025 Conference Board press release the LEI was 98.8 in June, the CEI was 115.1 in June, and the LAG was 119.9 in June.

An excerpt from the release:

“The US LEI fell further in June,” said Justyna Zabinska-La Monica, Senior Manager, Business Cycle Indicators, at The Conference Board. “For a second month in a row, the stock price rally was the main support of the LEI. But this was not enough to offset still very low consumer expectations, weak new orders in manufacturing, and a third consecutive month of rising initial claims for unemployment insurance. In addition, the LEI’s six-month growth rate weakened, while the diffusion index over the past six months remained below 50, triggering the recession signal for a third consecutive month. At this point, The Conference Board does not forecast a recession, although economic growth is expected to slow substantially in 2025 compared to 2024. Real GDP is projected to grow by 1.6% this year, with the impact of tariffs becoming more apparent in H2 as consumer spending slows due to higher prices.”

_________

I post various indicators and indices because I believe they should be carefully monitored.  However, as those familiar with this site are aware, I do not necessarily agree with what they depict or imply.

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6372.89 as this post is written

Wednesday, July 23, 2025

The U.S. Economic Situation – July 23, 2025 Update

Perhaps the main reason that I write of our economic situation is that I continue to believe, based upon various analyses, that our economic situation is in many ways misunderstood.  While no one likes to contemplate a future rife with economic adversity, current and future economic problems must be properly recognized and rectified if high-quality, sustainable long-term economic vitality is to be realized.

There are an array of indications and other “warning signs” – many readily apparent – that current economic activity and financial market performance is accompanied by exceedingly perilous dynamics.

I have written extensively about this peril, including in the following:

Building Financial Danger” (ongoing updates)

My analyses continues to indicate that the growing level of financial danger will lead to the next stock market crash that will also involve (as seen in 2008) various other markets as well.  Key attributes of this next crash is its outsized magnitude (when viewed from an ultra-long term historical perspective) and the resulting economic impact.  This next financial crash is of tremendous concern, as my analyses indicate it will lead to a Super Depression – i.e. an economy characterized by deeply embedded, highly complex, and difficult-to-solve problems.

For long-term reference purposes, here is a chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average since 1900, depicted on a monthly basis using a LOG scale (updated through July 18, 2025 with a last value of 44,342.19):

(click on chart to enlarge image)(chart courtesy of StockCharts.com)

DJIA since 1900

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6309.62 as this post is written

Tuesday, July 22, 2025

Money Supply Charts Through June 2025

For reference purposes, below are two sets of charts depicting growth in the money supply.

The first shows the M1, defined in FRED as the following:

Before May 2020, M1 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) demand deposits at commercial banks (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; and (3) other checkable deposits (OCDs), consisting of negotiable order of withdrawal, or NOW, and automatic transfer service, or ATS, accounts at depository institutions, share draft accounts at credit unions, and demand deposits at thrift institutions.

Beginning May 2020, M1 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) demand deposits at commercial banks (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; and (3) other liquid deposits, consisting of OCDs and savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts). Seasonally adjusted M1 is constructed by summing currency, demand deposits, and OCDs (before May 2020) or other liquid deposits (beginning May 2020), each seasonally adjusted separately.

Here is the “M1 Money Stock” (seasonally adjusted) chart, updated on July 22, 2025 depicting data through June 2025, with a value of $18,803.0 Billion:

M1SL

Here is the “M1 Money Stock” chart on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis, with a current value of 4.2%:

M1SL Percent Change From Year Ago

Data Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), M1 Money Stock [M1SL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 22, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1SL

The second set shows M2, defined in FRED as the following:

Before May 2020, M2 consists of M1 plus (1) savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts); (2) small-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement account (IRA) and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and (3) balances in retail money market funds (MMFs) less IRA and Keogh balances at MMFs.

Beginning May 2020, M2 consists of M1 plus (1) small-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) less IRA and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and (2) balances in retail MMFs less IRA and Keogh balances at MMFs. Seasonally adjusted M2 is constructed by summing savings deposits (before May 2020), small-denomination time deposits, and retail MMFs, each seasonally adjusted separately, and adding this result to seasonally adjusted M1.

Here is the “M2 Money Stock” (seasonally adjusted) chart, updated on July 22, 2025, depicting data through June 2025, with a value of $22,020.8 Billion:

M2SL

Here is the “M2 Money Stock” chart on a “Percent Change From Year Ago” basis, with a current value of 4.5%:

M2SL Percent Change From Year Ago

Data Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), M2 Money Stock [M2SL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; accessed July 22, 2025: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2SL

_____

The Special Note summarizes my overall thoughts about our economic situation

SPX at 6314.18 as this post is written